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Truth and Voice in Women’s Rights 
Margaret Urban Walker 




Truth commissions are a remarkable and novel political 
institution of our time. A truth commission is an official body “set up to 
investigate a past period of human rights abuses or violations of 
international humanitarian law” (Hayner 1994, 598). With the 
successful Latin American examples of the 1980s, over 20 truth 
commissions have been formed to date.i South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, described by political theorist Elizabeth 
Kiss as “the most morally ambitious truth commission to date” (Kiss 
2000, 70), set a new standard with its public testimonies of victims 
and perpetrators, aimed at restoring “the human and civil dignity of 
the victims,” a phrase that occurs repeatedly in its documents and its 
1998 Final Report.ii 
In the trend-setting Latin American cases truth commissions 
operated in the context of blanket amnesties shielding wrongdoers 
from criminal prosecution for precisely the offenses the commissions 
documented, so that truth commissions have been burdened with the 
reputation of being a “second best” proposition. Even so, their mission 
of truth-finding and truth-telling is increasingly recognized, around the 
world, as essential. Truth-processes other than truth commissions 
have been implemented in recent years as well. Following the fall of 
Communist governments, (then) Czechoslovakia adopted “lustration,” 
barring those who were on membership lists of secret police or various 
Communist Party organizations from holding public offices for five 
years. East Germany combined lustration with opening the Stasi 
(secret police) archives to those on whom the files were kept (see 
Curry 2000; Garton-Ash 1997; Rosenberg 1995). 
While truth-processes have proliferated over the past twenty 
years, the idea of a right to the truth as a human right is fairly new. It 
has emerged out of the practice of truth commissions and other truth-
processes rather than preceding them. The idea of “rights to truth” 
implies something stronger than the importance, or value, or positive 
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effect of the truth. It places truths, at least of certain kinds, or under 
certain conditions, in the category of a something claimable for oneself 
from others, where the claim has both moral legitimacy and urgency, 
and where the claim presumes the obligations of some parties to effect 
or enforce it. Rights to truth in cases of gross violations of human 
rights, like massacre, disappearance, or torture, have been understood 
as rights of victims, families, and societies to know or be told the truth 
about these matters, as well as rights to have the truth sought 
through impartial investigation.iii Even in the case of gross violations of 
human rights, however, not everyone’s truths are equally likely to be 
sought or told. Priscilla Hayner, in the most comprehensive study of 
truth commissions to date, cautions, “Perhaps the most commonly 
underreported abuses are those suffered by women, especially sexual 
abuse and rape” (Hayner 2001, 77). Hayner points to the stigma and 
shame that may silence women=s reports in many settings, but she 
also notes tendencies to see sexual violation as “secondary” or “added 
on,” or as individual whims, rather than primary violations. 
There is a good deal to be learned from, and a good deal to be 
done about, the persistent impediments to speaking and hearing the 
truths of women’s lives. I will argue that rights to truth must 
encompass rights to voice B to be an authoritative teller of the truth 
about one’s life and experience B as well as rights to know certain 
truths or to have them sought by others, and that these rights are as 
important to confronting cases of historically long-standing and 
systemic oppression as they are in addressing those episodes of 
violence usually called ‘gross violations of human rights.’ These are 
lessons to be drawn from feminist and other liberatory theories that 
make the possession of “voice” central to social justice and individual 
freedom. I will also argue that rights to truth B to its being told, but 
also to telling it B are not only instrumental but are fundamental rights 
for women and men, for they secure the moral, civil, and political 
dignity of those, including most women, who have been systemically 
silenced and epistemically discredited. In these ways they have been 
denied not only opportunity, equality, or well-being, but denied 
effective moral agency itself. 
 
Truths and Tellings 
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Rights to truth have been invoked in cases where the truths are 
those called ‘gross human rights violations,’ such as extrajudicial 
killings, torture, disappearance, arbitrary detention and inhumane 
treatment. These terrible truths that shatter, suspend, or corrode lives 
of their victims and others are not “unknown” to all; they are known to 
perpetrators and to living victims and sometimes to many others. But 
they are often known incompletely or without detail. In the case of 
extrajudicial killings and massacres, the living may “know” without 
being able to verify details or find the remains of their loved ones. And 
even when some possess the truth, it can be denied, or remain 
without public legitimation, known but not acknowledged.iv Many 
women have been among those who fought for the truth about others 
they loved, as did the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina and 
the Mothers of El Salvador and women marching in the Plaza of 
Martyrs in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The South African Commission, 
concerned that its human rights hearing drew many more women 
testifying about brutality to others than violations of their own rights, 
organized hearings specifically for women to come forward.v Whether 
truths are pursued by women or men, and whether they concern 
women or men, rights to truth have been invoked in a special kind of 
case, the case of state-sponsored or other organized violence hidden 
and denied. So it might seem that rights to truth are essentially rights 
to have certain truths discovered or acknowledged. And it might seem 
that rights to truth are not fundamental human rights, but rather that 
claims to truth are instrumental to the protection or exercise of other 
fundamental rights, like securing justice. I argue against both of these 
assumptions, that rights to truth incorporate rights to speak one’s 
truth, and that the standing to speak as well as know is constitutive of 
moral agency, rather than instrumental to some of its exercises. 
Rights to truth do not appear in the U.N. Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. Nor do they figure in U.N. conventions concerning 
torture or genocide. Some U.N. documents, like those on Enforced 
Disappearance and Extralegal Executions mandate “investigations,” as 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch urge in all cases of 
gross human rights violations. And a 1997 U.N. recommendation to 
combat impunity speaks of “full and effective exercise of the right to 
the truth.”vi Yet among earlier U. N. documents, CEDAW (the U.N. 
Convention to End All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened 
for ratification in 1980) is interesting in this respect. Although it does 
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not speak of rights to truth, CEDAW requires eliminating “prejudices” 
about women and women’s and men’s roles and “customary and all 
other practices” that support prejudices of women’s inferiority.vii It 
specially features basic education, as well as career, vocational, family, 
health, and family planning information. It is more detailed in its 
coverage of provisions for participation in public and political 
associations and entities, national and international, than is the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
I think it is not an accident that so many provisions of CEDAW, 
growing out of women’s movements, go closer to rights to truth, 
including rights to voice, while also directly addressing rights to work, 
credit and economic agency; rights to reproductive control, marital 
consent, and maternity provisions; and rights to protection from 
sexual exploitation. I see CEDAW as responsive to a complex of 
assumptions of feminist activism and theory that are shared with other 
twentieth century liberatory movements for rights that address 
oppressions based on group membership. The assumptions are these: 
1. Important truths may not just be “there” for the 
knowing. 
2. Truth is necessarily an interpersonal and social 
achievement that requires social, discursive, and material 
conditions. 
3. Getting certain truths told requires political will and is a 
matter of justice. 
4. It is an indignity to have one’s identity or community 
represented by lies, and to have to live with those lies. 
5. It is a constitutive element of dignity to be a possible 
bearer of truth about one’s experience of oneself and the 
world. 
6. The dignity of human beings is not acknowledged and 
enacted where human beings do not have initiative, 
access, and voice concerning what is true of their world 
and in their lives.viii 
On these assumptions it is not only unspoken truths about what 
are often called “unspeakable” acts of violence and brutality that must 
be retrieved, released, and publicly acknowledged. It is also crucial for 
human beings to be able to find and tell truths that are “unspeakable” 
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in other senses. There are truths unspoken out of despair, 
intimidation, or strategies of self-preservation under desperate 
conditions. There are truths that await telling because the vocabularies 
and forms of thought that will retrieve or release them are not yet 
available, or are not widely understood. There are truths that cannot 
yet be said in places and by people where they can have real 
interpersonal, social, and political effects. And there are truths whose 
tellings and tellers are discredited by the authority of others. 
This is why rights to truth matter not only in the cases of 
wrongs classified as gross violations of human rights. They are critical 
also to breaking the grip of long-standing systemic and cultural 
oppressions justified by reference to history and customs. The 
appreciation of this is one of the achievements of feminist, race, 
postcolonial, and gay and lesbian theory and politics, which have 
always been in important part works of truth and politics of truth. It 
also figures centrally in movements of Native, Aboriginal, or First 
Nations Peoples. The truth by itself does not set people free, but 
people’s abilities to set themselves free -- to claim freedoms and 
establish their dignity B do depend critically on their initiatives, access, 
and voice concerning what is true of their world and their lives. To say 
that we have a moral right to truth is to say that we have urgent and 
legitimate moral claims in this regard, and that these claims are not 
only reserved to “moral emergencies” or the kinds of extreme episodes 
of mass violence that tend to be called “human rights disasters.”ix 
Contemporary liberatory theories that emphasize voice have 
long recognized the stakes in suppression or denial of histories of 
injustice and destruction. These theories take seriously powers to 
silence as working parts of oppressive social and political 
arrangements; they see as fundamental the powers to speak that 
oppressive arrangements are careful to block or destroy. Philosophers 
Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman expressed it this way in their 
brilliant 1983 essay “Have We Got A Theory For You!” Women’s having 
“voice” is necessary both as a way to “increase the chances that true 
accounts of women’s lives will be given, but also because the 
articulation of experience (in myriad ways) is among the hallmarks of 
a self-determining individual or community” (Lugones and Spelman 
1983, 574). This way of putting it brings out two issues that have 
intertwined throughout several decades of feminist theories and 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Recognition, Responsibility and Rights: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory  (2003): pg. 169-180. Publisher link. This chapter 
is © Rowman & Littlefield and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. 
Rowman & Littlefield does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from Rowman & Littlefield. 
6 
 
women’s movements: the importance of revealing and responding to 
the actual truths of women’s different lives, as well as the necessity for 
women to be able to speak those truths out of their own mouths, with 
a presumption of basic credibility and authority. Rights to truth involve 
both rights to know the truths and rights to tell the truth. 
Preventions of Truth and Speechless Standings 
Although sometimes we speak of the truth when we mean “what 
really happened” or “what the facts are,” a truth is, more precisely, 
something told (that is, asserted or represented). What makes 
assertions or representations true is something in or about the world, 
something that in some cases can be established easily (e.g. looking 
and seeing) or in others can require complex procedures (e.g. 
techniques of forensic pathology). What is true, however, is something 
that someone says, or otherwise depicts or represents, as being so. A 
truth is a telling or other representing that has to be told or made or 
“put forward.” Bringing or putting the truth forward requires the will or 
motive to do so, the means to do so, the opportunity to do so, and the 
standing to do so. Truth commissions after eras of grisly and appalling 
violence bring forward truths that those who had power did not permit 
to be told publicly at expense to their power, and did not fear would 
ever be told. In these situations, there is not only an absence of truth, 
but what we might call, looking at truth as something told or brought 
forward, a prevention of truth.x 
But everyday, longstanding, historically embedded oppressive 
practices exhibit these same “preventions” of the truth. Those 
empowered and entitled by oppressive arrangement do not care about 
or will not accept the truths about what the arrangement is, why it is 
oppressive, what suffering and destruction it visits, and what benefits 
and immunities it allows them to enjoy. So every movement for 
liberation from injustice, humiliation, or cruelty needs not only to 
challenge an oppressive system or a practice, but to enunciate the 
truths, sweeping and small, of what that system really is. Often it is 
necessary to invent the language and symbolism that is capable of 
bringing those truths forward. Often it is necessary to overcome 
powerful feelings of fear or despair in speaking. Even when those with 
interests in certain truths and the will to speak them do have the 
expressive means to put them forward, they may still not have access 
to places where what they will say can be heard or understood in ways 
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that can have an effect. And finally, it is possible to make truths 
“unspeakable” by disabling the ability of some to have their words 
“count” in exactly the ways they are intended to, even if they succeed 
in speaking. 
The last form of silencing is the least familiar, but no less 
important. To have voice is not only to be able to speak, and not only 
to be able to be heard, but to be able to speak and be heard as saying 
the kind of thing that you are intending to say. Philosopher Rae 
Langton explains it this way: “Attempts by the slave to order or forbid 
[his master]...are unspeakable for the slave. Something has silenced 
his speech, not in the sense of rendering his spoken words inaudible or 
written marks illegible, but in the sense of...preventing those 
utterances from counting as the actions they were intended to be” 
(Langton 1993, 316). What is preventing this is not in this case his 
being gagged, threatened, hidden, or secluded, or his lacking the 
imagination, concepts, vocabulary, or initiative. It is his social and 
legal place, a standing that is precisely a lack of standing to issue 
anything that could amount, within that social and legal system, to an 
order to his master. 
Such speechless standings, for women, enslaved persons, or 
members of subject populations can be, and typically have been, 
written in the black letters of law, as when certain persons cannot give 
anything that counts as testimony in a court, or have no standing to 
enter legal actions or complaints. Such standings are also constituted 
by institutionally backed authorities whose certified expertise includes 
the power to declare what some people say as chatter, as 
symptomatic of irrationality or incompetence, as politically proscribed 
and outlawed speech, or as perversion or filth that in itself shows its 
source to be discredited. The educational, medical, religious and other 
authority or expertise of powerful men (and sometimes women) has 
often been exercised to disqualify the speech of women in these ways. 
These speechless standings can be constituted as well by reigning 
definitions of such terms as “politics,” or “development,” or “family” or 
“marriage,” so that certain people’s assertions about these matters do 
not qualify as relevant views. 
In a startling example, Priscilla Hayner reports that 
commissioners on the Amnesty Committee of South Africa’s TRC 
disqualified an application requesting amnesty for rape without serious 
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consideration because they could not see how rape could be “politically 
motivated” (Hayner 2001, 79-80). Under statutes for the new 
International Criminal Court, sexual violations of women are in fact 
under many circumstances war crimes or crimes against humanity.xi In 
February, 2001, guilty verdicts on three Bosnian soldiers at the 
International Tribunal at the Hague for the first time defined rape as a 
crime against humanity, and found holding the women in captivity and 
raping them a form of enslavement. Still, specifically sexual slavery 
suffered by women in many wartimes contexts is not yet 
acknowledged, nor is the category of genocidal rape yet in law 
(Simons 2001b; Vidovic 2001). Lawyers defending the three Bosnian 
Serb soldiers who were found guilty in February, 2001, of raping, 
torturing, and enslaving Muslim women in the town of Foca in Bosnia 
in 1992, claimed that “rape in itself is not an act that inflicts severe 
bodily pain” and that prosecutors failed to show that the raped women 
“were exposed to any severe physical or psychological suffering” 
(Simons 2001a). Rape as violation, torture, and political strategy 
remain even now difficult to speak if not unspeakable in some 
quarters. 
The vocabulary of rights, when it is available to someone with 
the socially recognized and protected standing of a bearer of rights, is 
itself an example of a socially empowered form of speech without 
which certain kinds of things are virtually impossible to say. Without 
the vocabulary that has some of the meaning and function that the 
vocabulary of “rights” now widely possesses, some assertions can only 
be seen as preferences, requests, pleas or complaints, rather than 
claims that require consideration or demands that must be met. So 
closely is the concept of “right” connected to the standing to enter 
claims for consideration, that to paraphrase one well-known 
philosopher, transposing the gender of his pronouns: To respect a 
person, or to think of her as possessed of human dignity, simply is to 
think of her as a potential maker of claims.xii Rights to truth imply 
claims to being a maker of assertions that embody a point of view and 
to be a possible bearer of the truth in what one asserts. A variety of 
material and social resources are needed, however, for that standing 
to be real and effective. 
Because intimidation and violent or costly reprisals are so often 
the conditions under which women decide what truths to speak, full 
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legal capacity and recourse to civil and criminal law, as well as 
opportunities for economic survival, are essential for women to tell 
their truths. Literacy and at least primary education are indispensable 
for women to get and use the information that allows them to see their 
lives accurately both as they are in reality and as they might otherwise 
be, as well as to share this information with others. Further, it won’t 
matter what women have to tell if they cannot be heard telling it in 
places where it can have an effect. Women’s access to public speech 
that is not simply ignored or discounted requires access to public roles, 
public spaces, and public media or venues of expression. The idea of 
“public” as opposed to “private” spaces is perhaps too closely tied to 
Euro-American political formations to be the right one for all contexts. 
The point is that women’s speech needs to be able, where women 
choose, to enter spheres beyond the personal, familial, domestic, or 
other borders that often confine it to women’s disadvantage. 
A right to be a teller of truths involves basic authority to assert, 
opine, testify, deny, contravert, or refuse, to be perceived as the 
possessor of a point of view and a possible bearer of truth. But that is 
not enough. People also need the opportunity to participate in 
processes that set forms of speech and standards of credibility. People 
need opportunities to enjoy some control over, if not access to, the 
forms and positions of expertise that shape cultural assumptions and 
social dialogue. I find it increasingly hard to see how in particular 
women’s initiative, access, and voice concerning what is true of the 
world and their lives can be more than remote possibilities without 
aggressive measures to insure not only political participation, but 
something closer to proportionate representation in the main local and 
society-wide institutions of governance that rule women’s and men’s 
lives. Inuit people in the new Canadian territory of Nunavut 
considered, but narrowly defeated, a system of dual-sex political 
representation (DePalma 1999). France recently adopted a legal 
requirement for equal numbers of women to be fielded by political 
parties in almost all elections (Daley 2001). These are measures that 
address the need to dismantle the disabling of women’s speech 
structurally at both the highest levels of social organization and on a 
society-wide scale. The same need exists in places of education and 
culture-making, where bodies of knowledge and the vocabulary and 
symbolism for socially authorized expression are propagated. 
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The link between voice and truth has consequences for 
understanding women’s situations and for women’s understanding 
their own situations. One example is the use of “adaptive” or 
“deformed” preferences (or in an older idiom “false consciousness”) to 
explain women’s apparent compliance or complicity with unjust and 
even painfully oppressive arrangements.xiii When women’s behavior 
that conforms to unjust or oppressive norms is explained as a case of 
“adaptive or deformed preferences” the women who comply are seen 
as actually preferring what is painful or disadvantageous because they 
have learned to prefer it. Sometimes it is said that they have 
“internalized” oppression. But this is not the only explanation of 
compliant behavior, and it is a very different kind of explanation from 
one that sees women’s compliant behavior as a kind of adaptation, 
that is, a strategy for living with, doing better in, or garnering some 
control in a hard, dangerous, or defeating situation. If a woman has 
chosen or learned a strategy by which a she protects herself or others 
while coping with oppressive or demeaning practices, she may 
continue to find these practices very painful, frustrating, or humiliating 
from her own point of view. She may very well see them as wrong, or 
cruel, or unjust, or shored up by power rather than by right or good 
sense. She may see them as the going “game” or “system” that she 
cannot change and so must work to protect herself and others within 
it. 
The difference between seeing “adaptive preferences” in 
women’s compliant behavior and seeing strategic “adaptations” is the 
difference, as Uma Narayan has put it, between seeing women as 
“prisoners” or “dupes” of patriarchy, and seeing them as agents, 
however seriously constrained, “bargaining with patriarchy,” 
something almost all women in fact do (Narayan 1997, Chapter 2; 
Narayan 2000). This is a very great difference, both as an explanation 
and as a moral evaluation, in how we understand what women do. One 
thing that is necessary, however, to distinguish cases where we are 
seeing realistic adaptations despite a woman’s preferences from cases 
where we are seeing actual deformations of her preferences 
themselves, is to hear women explain their choices from their points of 
view. But this is what they cannot do without will, expressive means, 
access, and voice. Even worse, however, without will, means, access, 
and voice women may not be able to make these distinctions to 
themselves, or to make them clearly. This means that without voice it 
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is difficult if not impossible to establish a fact of the matter about 
women’s behavior and preferences. One might reasonably ask whether 
there necessarily is a fact of the matter under these circumstances. 
The capacities for self-possession and self-revelation that come with 
having a voice go very deep, to the bases of moral agency. 
Rights to Truth: Instrumental and Fundamental 
Rights to truth and authority in shaping and telling it are 
instrumental in combating some especially harmful and defeating 
positions in which women can be placed or exploited by more powerful 
men and by more privileged women. Rights to truth and telling can 
enable women to claim their agency by announcing that they are 
negotiating their positions within unavoidable patriarchal structures 
the justice of which they do not accept. Rights to truth can be crucial 
political instruments. Their exercise can block “gendered nationalisms” 
that manipulate gendered identities, symbols, divisions of labor and 
resources, or putative “cultural traditions” of sex domination that are 
mobilized in national struggles to the disadvantage or subordination of 
women.xiv 
  What rights to truth protect, however, are not only instrumental 
goods. They assert one’s standing as a knower of the world and 
oneself, especially of the social world and one’s places in it individually 
and as a member of collectivities. This standing is not only a means to 
other good things. It is a constitutive element of civil, social, moral 
and political humanity. The capacity and standing to speak for oneself 
about one’s self, and especially about one’s own actions, is intimately 
linked to one’s moral being, what has sometimes been called a 
person’s “dignity.” Here, briefly, is one explanation why. 
We show how our behavior is human action by expressing our 
intentions, giving an account of what we are doing from our own point 
of view. We learn from others to give these accounts of ourselves, and 
we learn to elaborate, defend, or concede them, by doing so with 
others. When we are able to do this we are accountable for ourselves 
and to others, and so can be held to account. When women are 
silenced as self-describers of their actions and choices they lose, or 
never gain, the status of self-accounting actors in relations of mutual 
accountability. This is a roundabout way of saying: they lose, or never 
gain, the most basic status of a moral agent.xv Further, when anyone 
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is denied the standing to report for common consideration her or his 
experience, she or he is effaced even as the holder of a point of view, 
much less a moral actor with powers of agency, choice, and self-
understanding. 
Rights to truth and its telling are both instrumental and fundamental. 
For women who are disadvantaged and oppressed, they are a lifeline 
to the claiming of other rights. But for women and men they are also 
the emblem and embodiment of civil, political, and moral humanity.xvi 
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